
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Contraction Consistent Stochastic Choice
Correspondence
IZA DP No. 4596
November 2009
Indraneel Dasgupta 






















P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 










Contraction Consistent Stochastic Choice Correspondence
* 
 
We model a general choice environment via probabilistic choice correspondences, with 
(possibly) incomplete domain and infinite universal set of alternatives. We offer a consistency 
restriction regarding choice when the feasible set contracts. This condition, ‘contraction 
consistency’, subsumes earlier notions such as Chernoff’s Condition, Sen’s α and β, and 
regularity. We identify a restriction on the domain of the stochastic choice correspondence, 
under which contraction consistency is equivalent to the weak axiom of revealed preference 
in its most general form. When the universal set of alternatives is finite, this restriction is also 
necessary for such equivalence. Analogous domain restrictions are also identified for the 
special case where choice is deterministic but possibly multi-valued. Results due to Sen (Rev 
Econ Stud 38: 307-317, 1971) and Dasgupta and Pattanaik (Econ Theory 31: 35-50, 2007) 
fall out as corollaries. Thus, conditions are established, under which our notion of 
consistency, articulated only in reference to contractions of the feasible set, suffices as the 
axiomatic foundation for a general revealed preference theory of choice behaviour. 
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* This paper is, to a very great extent, the consequence of numerous conversations with Prasanta 
Pattanaik, though I alone am responsible for all remaining errors and weaknesses. I also acknowledge 
my intellectual debt to the late Dipak Banerjee, who introduced me to revealed preference theory. I 
also thank an anonymous referee for many helpful comments. 1.  Introduction 
The revealed preference approach to the general theory of choice seeks to: (i) offer intuitively 
plausible  a priori consistency postulates as axiomatic foundations for choice behaviour, and (ii) 
deduce the logical implications of such consistency postulates in specific analytical contexts.  The 
natural starting point for developing a notion of consistent choice would appear to be the context of 
‘set contraction’.  Suppose, starting from some initial choice situation, i.e., some collection of 
alternatives that are available to the decision-maker, the feasible set contracts, in that some 
alternatives become unavailable.  What kind of choice behaviour in the new situation should be 
deemed ‘reasonable’, in the sense of being intuitively consistent with choice in the initial situation?   
The basic answer offered appears to be: alternatives initially chosen should not be rejected 
because other alternatives have been eliminated.  The exact form this intuitive answer takes however 
varies.  Under the assumption that a single, unique, alternative is picked from each feasible set, so that 
choice behaviour is represented via deterministic choice functions (DCFs), Chernoff (1954) required 
the alternative initially chosen to continue to be chosen in the new situation, unless eliminated by the 
contraction of the feasible set.  The condition of ‘regularity’ generalizes this formulation to the 
context of stochastic choice functions (SCFs); i.e., to contexts where a single alternative is picked 
from a given feasible set, but exactly which alternative is chosen is determined according to some 
probabilistic rule.  Regularity requires the probability, of the chosen alternative lying in some 
collection  , not to fall when the feasible set contracts from  A B C ⊆ ⊆ A to B .  Sen (1969) 
considered the parallel generalization of DCFs to deterministic choice correspondences (DCCs), 
which permit multiple alternatives to be chosen from a feasible set, but only in a non-probabilistic 
fashion.
1  H i s  α  and β  conditions together require the following.  Suppose some subset of 
alternatives, say C , is chosen from the initial feasible set  A.  Then, assuming not every member of 
 is eliminated by the contraction of the feasible set to  C B , the choice set from B  should consist of 
all surviving members of C .
2  Nandeibam (2003) has offered a probabilistic version of this condition, 
which he terms regularity, in the context of a finite universal set of alternatives. 
                                                           
1  What we term a ‘choice function’ is often also referred to in the literature as an ‘element-valued 
choice function’, to demarcate it from our ‘choice correspondence’, which is termed a ‘set-valued choice 
function’. 
2  Assuming   is non-empty,  B C I α  requires the choice set of B  to be some superset of  .  
For all 
B C I
y x,  chosen under the feasible set B ,  β   requires the following: if  C x∈ , then  .  Thus,  C y∈ β  
can be equivalently stated as: the choice set of B  must be some subset of C , unless the intersection of the 
choice set of 
B I
B with C  is empty.  Consequently, , the two conditions together require the choice set of B  to be 
exactly   when   is non-empty.  While  B C I B C I β  is often termed ‘expansion consistency’, and the name 
‘contraction consistency’ reserved for α  , it is evident from the above formulation that β  can also be 
equivalently interpreted as a consistency restriction on choice from a contracted feasible set, distinct from α .  
We shall accordingly interpret both α  and β  as separate consistency restrictions on choice from a contracted 
feasible set. 
 1  Probabilistic choice and choice of multiple alternatives have both featured extensively, but 
usually independently, in the literature.
3  In the context of individual decision-making, it is widely 
recognized that random preferences and preferences that generate multiple best alternatives appear 
independently plausible on intuitive, as well as empirical, grounds.  Furthermore, in many theoretical 
contexts, it is helpful to represent an aggregation of individual, deterministic, choice correspondences 
by means of a probability distribution.
4  Thus, a unified framework that simultaneously permits the 
choice counterparts of both these properties, by means of stochastic choice correspondences (SCCs), 
is of considerable interest.  Within this unified framework, how should one interpret the notion of 
choosing consistently when the feasible set contracts?  Since most choice problems in economic 
contexts involve universal sets that are infinite, the condition of regularity in Nandeibam (2003) needs 
to be suitably expanded.  The first purpose of this paper is to offer such an expansion. 
Our second, more substantive, purpose is to advance this notion of ‘contraction consistent’ 
choice as the axiomatic foundation for a general revealed preference theory.  This necessitates an 
additional step.  Our interpretation should suffice to generate choice restrictions across two feasible 
sets, neither of which includes the other.  Versions of the weak axiom of revealed preference 
(WARP), designed for DCFs, DCCs and SCFs, have been developed explicitly to cover such cases.  
Predictive implications of the standard theory in alternative analytical contexts are typically deduced 
from corresponding versions of the weak axiom, whether singly or in conjunction with other 
conditions.  Our notion of contraction consistent choice in the general context of SCCs should 
therefore imply a correspondingly expanded version of WARP, which subsumes all earlier, restrictive, 
versions.  Accordingly, we offer a version of the weak axiom, expanded to cover SCCs, which is 
shown to follow from our notion of contraction consistency, under reasonable domain restrictions. 
Analogous exercises were performed by Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) in the context of 
SCFs, and by Sen (1971) in the context of DCCs.  The analysis in the present paper, carried out in the 
completely general context of SCCs, thus subsumes, integrates and supersedes these earlier findings. 
Section 2 formalizes the idea of representing choice behaviour via SCCs.  We introduce our 
two consistency postulates for SCCs, viz. contraction consistency (NC) and the weak axiom of 
stochastic revealed preference (WASRP), in section 3.  Our NC expands Nandeibam’s (2003) notion 
of regularity to permit universal sets which are not-necessarily finite, whereas our WASRP expands 
                                                           
3  Recent examples of the literature on probabilistic choice include Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and 
Pattanaik (2004, 2002, 1999), Barbera and Pattanaik (1986), Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2008, 2007), McCausland 
(2009), McFadden (2005) and Nandeibam (2009).  Dasgupta (2009) develops a stochastic theory of competitive 
firm behaviour.  Contributions in the DCC framework include Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) in the general 
choice context, and Richter (1966), Afriat (1967) and Varian (1982) in the specific context of consumers’ 
demand. 
4  For example, Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2002) discuss how, in the context of 
consumers’ choice, the analytical construct of a stochastic demand function may usefully be deployed to provide 
the aggregate representation of a collection of individual, deterministic, demand functions.  Dasgupta (2009) 
provides a supply theoretic analogue.  The literature on collective choice has analyzed at length the implications 
 2the version in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) to permit multi-valued choice.  In section 3, we also 
clarify how our two consistency postulates subsume and unify various analogous notions available in 
the literature.  The relationship between the two postulates is discussed in section 4.  While WASRP 
necessarily implies NC, if the SCC is not defined for some subsets of the universal set of 
alternatives,
5 it can violate WASRP while satisfying NC.  We identify a restriction on the domain of 
the SCC under which the two conditions are equivalent.  This restriction permits the domain to be 
‘incomplete’, i.e., not defined for some subsets of the universal set.  Our domain restriction also 
happens to be necessary for NC to imply WASRP, when the universal set is finite
6.  We then provide 
a domain restriction which suffices for NC to imply WASRP, for the special case of DDCs, i.e., of 
degenerate SCCs.  As before, this restriction also turns out to be necessary when the universal set is 
finite.  Lastly, we clarify how Sen’s (1971) result regarding the equivalence between the co bination 
of his 
m
α  and β  conditions and WARP for DCCs, and the key findings of Dasgupta and Pattanaik 
(2007), all follow as special cases of our general analysis.  Section 5 concludes.  Proofs are relegated 
 the appendix.  to
 
2.  Stochastic choice correspondence 
Let  X denote the (non-empty) universal set of alterna   Given any set  tives. T ,  () T r  will denote the 
le non-em ty subsets of T and  class of all possib p ( ) T R  wil the power set of T (i.e., 
() () { RT rT ≡ U
l denote 
φ }, where φ  denotes the empty set).  Thus,  ( ) X r Z ⊆  will d ote a on  
class of non-empty subsets of the un ersal set of alternativ .  G
en
s, T and 
 n -empty
iv es iven two set T′,  [] T T ′ \  
will denote the set of all elements of T that do not belong to T′.   
 
Definition 2.1.  Let  () X r ⊆ Z ≠ φ .  A stochastic choice correspondence (SCC) over Z is a rule S  
ry which, for eve   Z A∈
() A  being th
, specifies exactly one fi additive probability measure   o nitely   
 ( e set of outcomes and 
A Q n
() () () A r R A r , () r ( ) ( ) A r R  being the relevant algebra in  () A r ). 
 
Consider a given non-empty collection of non-empty subsets of the universal set of alternatives ( X ), 
say  Z .  Z  represents the colle ion of all the different feasible sets of alternatives that the decision-
maker may ace.  Notice that 
ct
f   Z  may p ssibly be incomplete, in that so e subsets of  o m X  may not 
belong to Z .  Suppose an SCC, say S , is defined over the domain Z .  Then S  is a complete 
specification of choice behaviour when faced with different permissible feasible sets, i.e., different 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of following various probabilistic social decision rules, especially random dictatorship (e.g. Nandeibam, 2008, 
2003, 1996; Pattanaik and Peleg, 1986). 
5  This is the case in many theoretical contexts, including the standard theory of consumers’ behaviour. 
6  This is the case commonly considered, for example, in social choice contexts. 
 3members of  he collection  t Z .  Let  Z A∈  denote some permissible feasible set.  Faced with the 
feasible set  A, any non-empty subset from  A (i.e., any member of  () A r ) may be picked as 
the choice set (i.e., the collection of chosen alternatives).  Given 
the class 
( ) A r a ⊆ , the SC  sp  
probability,  () a QA , that the choice set actually picked will belong to the collection a .   ()
C ecifies the
( ) B S A S ,  
etc. will be denoted, respectively, by  B A Q Q ,  etc.  Thus, an SCC captures the idea that, given a 
feasible set: (i) one may pick a subset with multiple elements, an
alternati
i
CCs and  Fs are all sp ss of SCCs.  Formally   
d (ii) one m
, we define the follow
a
ing.
y choose among the 
tively, SCFs, 
ve subsets available in a probabilistic fashion.   
An SCC is the most flexible tool available for modelling choice behaviour.  Intu
D DC ecial cla es 
 
Definition 2.2.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ , and let S  be some SCC over Z . 
(i)   is singular, iff, for all  S Z A∈ d for every  , an ( ) A r ⊆ a ,  ( ) {} () 1 | = A a a Q = ∈ i . 
i) 
i a Q a
( ) A r a∈  such that  {} ( ) a Q 1.   is degenerate, iff, for all  Z A∈ S = (i , there exists 
 
An SCC is singular when the probability of choosing a non-singleton set is zero.  It is degenerate 
when choice is, in effect, deterministic.  An SCC is singular and degenerate when exactly one 
alternative is picked, that too in a deterministic fashion.  We shall identify a singular SCC with an 
CF, a deg CC  and S enerate S with a DCC, and a singular   degenerate SCC with a DCF.      
 
Remark 2.3.  An SCC over Z  may be constructed as an  regate sentation of n  (possibly 
different) DCCs over 
agg  repre
Z .  Given any  Z A∈ , and any  ( ) A r a ⊆ , let  ( ) a pA  denote the proportion of 
such DCCs which specify a choice set belonging to the collection
ntifying 
  . a  Then one can construct an SCC 
as an aggre e representati  ide n  DCCs by ( ) a  with 
postulates for choice behaviour. 
() a pA QA .  gat on of these 
 
3.  Contraction consistency and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference 
We now in duce our two rationality ,  tro , or consistency
 
Definition 3.1.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ .  An SCC over Z   co satisfies  e  (NC) iff, for 
all  
ntraction consist ncy
Z B A ∈ , such that  A, B ⊆  and for all non-empty  ( ) B r C ⊂ , 
() ( ) {} () C B s A s Q C Q A B ∈ ⊆ ≥ I | .                                                                                  (3.1) 
et
 
Consider some initial feasible s   Z A∈ , and some  A B ⊆ ,  Z B∈ .  Let C  be an arbitrary (non-
pty) collection of subsets of  em B .  Consider the probability of choosing a subset whose overlap with 
 4B  happens to be a member of C .  Intuitively, it seems reasonable to argue that this probability 
should not fall when the feasible set is reduced from  A to B , since such a move only eliminates 
alternatives outside B .  This is the requirement imposed by our contraction consistency.
7 
  In the special case of a finite universal set of alternatives, our NC is equivalent to the version 
of regularity provided by Nandeibam (2003).  We proceed to clarify how our NC relates to earlier, 
logous, re h finitions 2. ply the following.  ana strictions in t e literature.  De 2 and 3.1 im
 
Observation 3.2.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ .   
(i) A  ll  Z B A ∈ , such that  A B ⊆ , and for all non- singular SCC over Z   NC iff, for a satisfies
empty  B C ⊆ ,  {} {} () { } { } ( ) C x x Q C x x Q A B ∈ ≥ ∈ | | .                                                       
(ii) A  degenerate
                         
 SCC over 
      
Z  s Z A B atisfies NC iff, for all  ∈ , such that  , and for all  A B ⊆
non-empty  B C ⊆ , [ {} ( ) 1 = C QB  if  ( ) { } ( ) 1 | = = ⊆ C B s s QA I ]. 
(iii) A  s ar a te S
A
 Z , A BZ ∈ ingul  degenera CC over nd  satisfies NC ff, for all   i  such that 
 for all , [
A B ⊆ , 
  B x∈ { } { } ( ) 1 = x { } { } ( ) 1 = x QA ] QB  if  and . 
ta a
 
When choice is confined to singleton subsets of alternatives, Observation 3.2(i) implies NC is 
equivalent to the condition of regularity specified in the literature with regard to SCFs (e.g. 
Nandeibam, 2008, 1996; Pat naik  nd Peleg, 1986).  This requires the probability, of the chosen 
ernative lying in a subset C  of  alt B , not to decrease when we contract the feasible set from  A to 
B .
8  When choice is restricted to be deterministic (but possibly non ingleto ), Observation 3.2(ii) 
implies the equivalence of NC with the combination of Sen’s (1969) 
-s n
α  and β  conditions, specified 
tion to DCCs.  This requires the following.  If some alternative  x in rela B ∈  is chosen under  A, then 
B y∈  will be rejected under B  if, and only if,  y  is also rejected under  A.
9  If choice is constrained 
to be deterministic  ingleton, Observation 3.2(iii) implie the equivalence of NC with Chernoff’s and s  
r
s 
(19 estriction:  B x∈  must continue to be chosen under B  if  x  is chosen under B A ⊇ .    54) 
Our next step is to introduce a generalized vers WARP - one that is applicable to SCCs. 




7  The LHS in (3.1) is 1 if  ( ) B r C = .  Hence NC implies (3.1) must hold for all non-empty 
.      () B r C ⊆
8  Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) specify the quantifier erroneously in their definition (Def. 2.6(i)) of 
regularity. 
B y∈ B  α
9  Condition  is the req ent that  uirem  w  under  ill be rejected  only if  is also rejected 
under  . Condition
  y
A  β  requires th llowing ativ  is chos der bot  and  e fo en un h  A B  altern e x : if some , then 
 will be reject nde [ y∈B ed u r B  if  y  is also re r  ].  Recall footno    jected unde A te 2.
 5Definition 3.3.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ .  An SCC over Z satisfies the weak axiom of 
reference (W , and for all non-empty
stochastic revealed 
ASRP) iff, for all  B A, Z ∈   ( ) B A r C I ⊂ ,  p
  () () ( ) {} () ( ) { } ( ) C B s A s Q C A s Q B A r Q A B A ′ B s ⊆ ′ | ∈ ∈ ⊆ − ≥ I I | \ .                      (3.2) 
 
Cons o feasible  ts  Z B A ∈ , .  Let C  be some arbitrary collection of subsets wh  
available under both  A and 
ider tw se ich are
B .  Consider the probability of choosing a subset whose overlap 
with B AI  belongs to C .  Suppose this probability rises when the feasible set changes from  A to B  
(so that the RHS of the inequality in (3.2) is positive).  It seems reasonable to argue that this rise 







cr uld not ex   obability of choosing a subset comprised exclusively of
alte  our WASRP.  
at Definitions 2 and 3.3 together imply the following. 
Observation 3.4.  Let 
the 
 such  in ease sho
rnati
d
ves, which is  () () B A r QA \ ).  This is the restriction imposed on SCCs by
 
We now note th  2.
 
() X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ . 
(i) A  singular SCC over Z satisfies WASRP iff, for all  A Z B∈ , , and for every non-empty 
,   {} { ( ( B A C I ⊆ ) ) } ) ( { } { ( }) { } { ( }) C C x x Q A A x x Q x x Q B B B ∈ ≥ ∈ | ∈ − | |                            \ .                                     
(ii)  A degenerate SCC over Z satisfies WASRP iff, for all  Z B A ∈ , , and for every non-empty 
( A ) B C I ⊆ , if  ( ) {} () 1 | = () ( ) \ A B r = ⊆ C B s A s QA I , then:  1 = QB  when 
( 0 | s .        ) = ′ A I {} () = C                          ⊆ ′ B s QB
satisfies WASRP iff, for all  , and for every  Z B A ∈ , Z (iii)  A singular and degenerate SCC over 
[] B A x I ∈ , if  {} {} () 1 = x QA , then:   { } ( ) { } ( ) 1 \ | = ∈ ′ ′ A B x x QB  when   { } { } ( ) 0 = x QB .                        
 
Observation 3.4 clarifies how our WASRP integrates and subsumes earlier versions of the weak 
axiom.  Our WASRP, when confined to singular SCCs, becomes equivalent to WASRP for SCFs, 
introduced by Bandyopadhyay et al. (1999) in the cont y 
Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) for the general choice context.  This requires the probability, under  A, 
of the chosen alternative belonging to some subset of  B AI , not to exceed the probability, under 
      
ext of consumers’ demand and reformulated b
B , 
of the c ti
, . 
hosen alterna ve either lying in that subset or being unavailable under  A.  When confined to 
degenerate SCCs, our WASRP is equivalent to WARP for DCCs (Arrow, 1959; Sen  1971)  This 
                                                           
10  When  ( ) B A r C I =
)
, (3.2) must hold trivially.  Hence WASRP implies (3.2) for all non-empty 
.  Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2008) have presented a version of WASRP in the specific context of  ( B A r C I ⊆
 6requires: if an alternative is rejected in one situation, it cannot be chosen in another, so long as some 
alternative chosen in the first is also available in the second.  Lastly, in the case of a degenerate and 
singular SCC, our WASRP is equivalent to WARP for DCFs, introduced by Samuelson (1938) in the 
context of consumers’ choice, and reformulated by Houthakker (1950) for the general choice context.  
This requires, when the alternative chosen under   is also available under  A B , that the alternative 
chosen under B  be either identical to that chosen under  A, or else unavailable under  A.  
 
Z Remark 3.5.  Consider a collection of   DCCs defined over some domain  n .  As discussed earlier 
(Remark 2.3), one can construct an SCC over Z  as an aggregate representation of these   DCCs.  It 
can be checked that, if all such DCCs individually satisfy Sen’s (1969) 
n
α  and β  conditions, then the 
SCC so constructed must satisfy NC.  Analogously, if the constituent DCCs all satisfy WARP, then 
their aggregate SCC representation must satisfy our WASRP. 
 
4.  Results 
We are now ready to characterize the relationship between our two consistency restrictions on SCCs, 
viz. contraction consistency and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference.  We first introduce 
some notation, before proceeding to present and discuss our central results. 
 
( ) X Notation 4.1.  Let  be the set of all non-empty  ℑ r Z ⊆  such that, for all , at least one of 
the following two conditions holds: 
, AB Z ∈
1 ≤ AI B ;                                           (4.1)     
 and ( ) Z A ∈
~






,  B B ⊆
~






U .  (4.2)                           
 
Proposition 4.2.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ .   
(i)  An SCC over Z satisfies NC if it satisfies WASRP. 
(ii)  An SCC over Z satisfying NC also satisfies WASRP when  ℑ ∈ Z . 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
Corollary 4.3.  An SCC over   satisfies NC if and only if it satisfies WASRP.  ℑ ∈ Z
 
By Proposition 4.2(i), WASRP implies NC, irrespective of the domain of the SCC.  By Proposition 
4.2(ii), NC implies WASRP when the domain of the SCC is restricted to the class  .  Thus, by 
Proposition 4.2, NC and WASRP are equivalent when the domain of the SCC belongs to the class 
ℑ
ℑ.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
consumers’ choice, modelled via stochastic demand correspondences.  The version introduced in this paper 
implies their version, when translated to our general choice context. 
 7Since  , this in turn implies the equivalence of the two consistency restrictions for SCCs 
with complete domain, i.e., SCCs defined over all possible non-empty subsets of the universal set of 
alternatives.  Since the class   may also contain members other than 
()ℑ ∈ X r
ℑ ( ) X r , Corollary 4.3 implies 
that NC and WASRP may be equivalent even if the domain of the SCC is incomplete, i.e., even if the 
SCC is not defined for some possible non-empty subsets of the universal set of alternatives. 
  Recall now that, when the SCC is constrained to be singular, the restrictions imposed by our 
NC and WASRP turn out to be equivalent, respectively, to those imposed on an SCF by the condition 
of regularity and the version of WASRP advanced by Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007).  Dasgupta and 
Pattanaik (2007) show that, for SCFs, their version of WASRP implies regularity, while the converse 
also holds when the domain of the SCF is restricted to the class ℑ.
11  Thus, our Proposition 4.2 and 
Corollary 4.3 extend these findings beyond their SCF-based context, so that these central results in 
Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) fall out as a special case of our more general, SCC-based, analysis. 
  Proposition 4.2(ii) provides a sufficient domain restriction for NC to imply WASRP.  Is this 
also necessary?  With a particular infinite universal set of alternatives, Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) 
provide an example of an SCF with domain  ℑ ∉ Z  which satisfies regularity, yet violates their 
WASRP.  It follows that, when  X  is infinite and the domain of a (singular) SCC falls outside the 
class  , satisfaction of NC need not imply the satisfaction of our WASRP for SCCs.  Dasgupta and 
Pattanaik (2007) also show that, when the universal set of alternatives is finite, given any arbitrary 
domain  , one can always construct an SCF which satisfies regularity, yet violates WASRP for 
SCFs.  Thus, given a finite universal set of alternatives, whenever the domain falls outside the class 
, there necessarily exists a (singular) SCC that satisfies NC, yet violates our WASRP.  It follows 
that, in a general setting which makes no prior assumption regarding the cardinality of the universal 
set of alternatives, NC implies WASRP only if the domain of the SCC belongs to the class  .  In this 
sense, our domain restriction turns out to be not only sufficient, but also necessary, for NC to imply 






Proposition 4.4 (Dasgupta and Pattanaik, 2007).  Let  ( ) X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ . 
(i)  If  X  is infinite, there may exist an SCC over some  ℑ ∉ Z  which satisfies NC but violates 
WASRP. 
(ii)  If  X is finite, for every  ℑ ∉ Z , there must exist an SCC over Z  which satisfies NC but 
violates WASRP. 
 
                                                           
11  Notice that [  implies (4.2).  The corresponding domain restriction in Dasgupta and 
Pattanaik (2007) (their Notation 4.1) thus contains a redundancy, which is eliminated in Notation 4.1 here. 
] Z B A ∈ I
 8Lastly, consider the special case where SCCs are constrained to be degenerate.  This is the 
environment typically considered in traditional investigations.  We now specify a restriction on the 
domain that turns out to be both necessary and sufficient for NC to imply WASRP in this case.   
 
Notation 4.5.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ .  Let  ℑ be the set of all Z  such that, for all  , we have 
(4.1) or (4.3) or (4.4) below: 
, AB Z ∈
  ;                                                                                                                          (4.3)  Z B A ∈ U






,  B B ⊆
~
, {}  and  ]
~ ~
[ , B A y x I ⊆
( ) () B U A B AU ⊂
~ ~
].                                                                                                          (4.4) 
 
Remark 4.6.  While  ℑ ⊆ ℑ , it is not true that  ℑ ⊆ ℑ : Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) provide a 
domain that belongs to ℑ, but falls outside ℑ.  Thus, ℑ  is, in general, a larger class than  .    ℑ
 
Notation 4.7.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ .  Let   be the set of all  ℑ ˆ Z such that, for all , we have 
(4.1) or (4.3) or (4.5) below:                                  
, AB Z ∈




:  A A ⊆
~
,  B B ⊆
~
,  {} ]
~ ~
[ , B A y x I ⊆ , 
( ) () B A B A U U ⊂
~ ~
 and ( ) ]
~ ~
Z B ∈ AU .                                                                               (4.5)  
 
Two examples:  Let  {} {} { } {} x z z y y x Z , , , , , 1 = .  Then, given any  Z B A ∈ , , (4.1) must hold (and 
(4.2), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) all violated) if A,B are distinct, while both (4.2) and (4.3) must vacuously hold 
(and (4.1), (4.4), (4.5) all violated) otherwise.  Thus,  ℑ ∈ 1 Z ,  ℑ ∈ 1 Z  and  . Now consider 
.  Notice that, for 
ℑ ∈ ˆ
1 Z
{} y z y x Z , , , 2 = {} {} w z, , { } { } w z y , , B z y , , x, A = = , (4.1), (4.2), (4.3), (4.4) and 
(4.5) are all violated.  Hence,  ,  ℑ ∉ 2 Z ℑ ∉ 2 Z  and  .  ℑ ∉ ˆ
2 Z
 
Lemma 4.8.  (i)    ℑ ⊆ ℑ ˆ  and (ii) if  X  is finite,  ℑ = ℑ ˆ . 
Proof:  See the Appendix.                                                                                                       
 
Remark 4.9.  Regardless of the cardinality of     (but it is not true that 
12 , X ℑ ⊆ ℑ ˆ ℑ ⊆ ℑ ˆ ).  Thus, 
Lemma 4.8(i) implies  ℑ ⊆ ℑ ⊆ ℑ ˆ .  When  X is infinite, there exist domains that belong to  ℑ  but 
                                                           
12  In light of Lemma 4.8(ii), the example with finite  X  in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) (their 
Example 5.1), which shows that Z  may belong to ℑ , yet fall outside ℑ , also suffices to establish this claim. 
 9not to  .  To see this, consider the following example. Let  ℑ ˆ [ ] {} [ 2 , 1 5 . 0 , 0 1 , 2 U U ] − − = X , and let 
[] {} {} [] { } { 1 | 5 . 0 , 0 1 , 2 1 | 5 . 0 , 0 } 2 , 1 ≤ < − − ≤ < = b b a Z U U U a .  Then, for every  Z A∈ ,  either (i)  
 for some   or (ii)  [] ,a {} 5 . 0 , 0 1 U A = ( ] 2 , 1 ∈ a [ ] { } 5 . 0 , 0 U 1 ,− − = b A
Z ∉ 5 . 0 ,
 for some  .  Notice 
that, (i){}, and (ii) for all 
( ] 2 , 1 ∈ b
0 ( ] 2 , 1 , ∈ b a ,  [ ] { } [ ] ( ) Z b ∉ a − − 1 , 5 . 0 , 0 U , 1 U .  It can then be 
checked that  ℑ ∈ Z  but  .    ℑ ˆ




Proposition 4.10.  Let φ .  Then: 
Z ℑ ∈ ˆ (i)  for every  , if a degenerate SCC  over  S Z  satisfies NC, then   must also satisfy WASRP; 
(ii)  if 
S
X is finite,  for every  , there must exist a degenerate  SCC over  ℑ ∉ ˆ Z Z  which satisfies NC 
but violates WASRP. 
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
X ℑ , the class  Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) show that, given a finite   provides a domain 
restriction that is both necessary and sufficient for Chernoff’s Condition to imply WARP for DCFs.   
In light of Lemma 4.8(ii), Proposition 4.10, in effect, generalizes this result beyond their context of 
DCFs to that of DCCs.  In light of Lemma 4.8(i) and Remark 4.9, part (i) of Proposition 4.10 also 
goes beyond the analysis in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) by providing a sufficient domain 
restriction for Chernoff’s condition to imply WARP, regardless of the cardinality of the domain.     
Furthermore, Proposition 4.10(i) offers a sufficient domain restriction under which the 
combination of Sen’s α  and β  conditions turns out to be equivalent to WARP for DCCs.  Recall 
that, when the SCC is degenerate, the restrictions imposed by NC and WASRP are equivalent, 
respectively, to those imposed on a DCC by the combination of Sen’s  β α  and   conditions and 
WARP.  Sen (1971) establishes the equivalence, between WARP and the combination of his  α  and 
Z β  conditions, for DCCs whose domain   includes every two-element subset of the universal set of 
alternatives (i.e., when, for all distinct  { } Z y x ∈ ,
ˆ
X y x ∈ , ,  ).
13  Evidently, any such domain 
(including, obviously, the complete domain) must belong to our class ℑ; additionally, there may exist 
domains which belong to   but fall outside the class identified by Sen. ℑ ˆ
                  
14  Thus, our Proposition 
                                          
13  Sen (1971) formally states his equivalence result under the assumption that the domain is complete, 
i.e. it contains all non-empty subsets of the universal set of alternatives, but his proof only requires the domain 
to contain all two-element subsets of the universal set.  Evidently, the complete domain restriction implies, but 
is not implied by, the latter; which in turn is stronger than our domain restriction ℑ ˆ .  See footnote 14 below. 
14  Suppose  {} { } { } { } X B A Z e d c b B d c b a A e d c b a X , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , = = = = .  Then  , 
even though 
ℑ ∈ ˆ Z
Z violates Sen’s restriction, since the domain does not contain any two-element subset of 
alternatives (and thus, obviously, the domain is not complete either). 
 104.10(i) subsumes Sen’s result, by showing that the class of domains over which his α  and β  
conditions imply WARP for DCCs is, in general, larger than the one he identifies.  Furthermore, Sen 
does not address the issue of necessity, which is covered by Proposition 4.10(ii) (for the general case 
where the universal set is not constrained to be infinite). 
By Proposition 4.2(ii), an SCC over  ℑ ∈ Z  must satisfy WASRP if it satisfies NC, regardless 
of whether it is degenerate or non-degenerate.  Recall however that there exist domains which belong 
to   but not   (Remark 4.9).  Thus, Propositions 4.4(ii) and 4.10(i) together imply that there are 
domains over which: (i) every degenerate SCC satisfying NC also satisfies WASRP, but (ii) there 
exist non-degenerate SCCs satisfying NC which violate WASRP.   
ℑ ˆ ℑ
By Proposition 4.10(ii), given any arbitrary finite  X  and any arbitrary domain Z  outside the 
class  , there exists at least one degenerate SCC over  ℑ ˆ Z  which satisfies NC but not WASRP.  A 
weaker version of this necessity claim (with regard to the domain restriction  ) can be extended to 
the case of infinite
ℑ ˆ
X .  Even when  X  is infinite, there may exist SCCs with domain   which 
satisfy NC but violate WASRP.  Consider for example the domain specified in Remark 4.9 above.  
Define a singular and degenerate SCC over 
ℑ ∉ ˆ Z
Z  as follows: (i) for every  Z A∈  such that 
 for some  ,  [] , 1 a { 5 . 0 , 0 U A = } ( , 1 ∈ ] 2 a { } { } 0 1 = A Q ; and (ii) for every  Z A∈  such that 
 for some  [] , 0 1 , U − = A { 5 . 0 } −b ( ] 2 , 1 ∈ b ,  { } { } 5 1 . 0 = A Q
ℑ Z
.  This SCC satisfies NC, but violates 
WASRP.  Thus, NC does not imply WASRP if   - even when the universal set of alternatives is 
infinite.  However, we do not know whether, given any arbitrary infinite 
∉ ˆ
X , there necessarily exists 
a degenerate SCC satisfying NC but violating WASRP, for every possible Z  outside the class  .  
We suspect this is so, but, since we have been unable so far to construct a general example for the 
infinite case, this remains an open question.  The issue is analogously unresolved for infinite 
ℑ ˆ
X with 
regard to non-degenerate SDCs defined over domains outside the class ℑ (recall Proposition 4.4). 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have considered a general choice context, where decision-makers may choose 
probabilistically among (possibly multi-element) subsets of a given feasible set of alternatives.  We 
have modelled such choice behaviour in terms of an SCC with possibly incomplete domain, i.e., one 
which need not be defined over all possible non-empty subsets of the universal set of alternatives.  We 
have introduced a minimal consistency postulate, viz. contraction consistency, which restricts choice 
behaviour when the feasible set is contracted, as well as a generalized version of WARP.  The first 
condition generalizes the condition of regularity in Nandeibam (2003), while the second subsumes the 
version introduced in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007).  Our substantive results identify the relationship 
between the two conditions.  While the latter necessarily implies the former regardless of the domain 
 11of the SCC, the reverse relationship does not hold.  We have identified a restriction on the domain of 
the SCC, under which the two consistency postulates turn out to be equivalent.  This restriction 
includes a complete domain, while also permitting the domain to be incomplete.  When the universal 
set of alternatives is finite, we have shown that this domain restriction constitutes a necessary, as well 
as sufficient, condition for contraction consistency to imply our generalized version of the weak 
axiom.  We have also identified another domain restriction as both necessary and sufficient for the 
two conditions to be equivalent when one constrains SCCs to be degenerate, in addition to assuming 
the universal set to be finite.  This condition suffices even when the universal set is infinite.  Our 
results subsume the SCF-based analysis in Dasgupta and Pattanaik (2007) within the more general 
environment of probabilistic multi-valued choice.  Key results for the deterministic non-singleton 
choice environment, due to Sen (1971), also turn out to be implied as special cases of our analysis. 
The major thrust of our analysis lies in advancing our notion of contraction consistency as the 
foundational axiom for a general revealed preference approach to the theory of choice.   
Considerations of plausibility, transparency and weak requirements would all appear to support its 
claim.  This condition permits the immediate generalization of all earlier, restrictive analyses based on 
Chernoff’s Condition, the combination of Sen’s α  and β  conditions, or regularity, to an expanded 
environment of probabilistic multi-element choice from possibly infinite feasible sets.   Our analysis 
shows that one may utilize NC to achieve such a generalization even when some version of the weak 
axiom of revealed preference is necessary to generate significant empirical or predictive 
consequences.  This is when the context of the theory makes it reasonable to assume that the SCC is 
defined over a domain sufficient for NC to imply WASRP.  Our results characterize the general 
conditions under which this can be achieved; conditions which may be applied to specific theoretical 
contexts in future investigations.
 15  Future work may also seek to identify domain restrictions under 




Proof of part (i) of Proposition 4.2.  Let  ( ) X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ , and let   be some SCC over  S Z  satisfying 
WASRP.  Consider any  such that  , and any non-empty  .  To show that    Z B A ∈ , A B ⊆ () B r C ⊂ S
                                                           
15  For example, consumers routinely face governments who tax/subsidize and ration goods.  Since the 
intersection of two ‘budget triangles’ in a two-good world can be generated as the consumer’s feasible set under 
an appropriate tax-subsidy regime (where purchases above and below some threshold are taxed/subsidized at 
differential rates), it appears natural to include the intersection of two budget triangles in the domain of the SCC.  
NC can then replace WASRP as the foundational rationality axiom for demand analysis in the two-good case.  
Analogously, in many collective choice contexts, given any two feasible sets in the domain, it may be intuitively 
reasonable to include their union in the domain as well.  Dasgupta (2009, 2005) has introduced a consistency 
restriction on competitive firm behaviour which implies neither profit maximization nor cost minimization, but 
nevertheless suffices to generate the standard predictions regarding supply behaviour.  It would be useful to 
investigate whether his consistency condition in turn can be derived from restrictions akin to NC. 
 12satisfies NC, we need to show that (3.1) holds.  Let  ( ) [ ] C B r D \ ≡ .  By WASRP, noting  , and  A B ⊆
) (B r D ⊂ ≠ φ , we get: 
() () ( ) { ( } ) ( ) D QB ≥ A r QA D B s A s Q B A ∈ ⊆ + I | \ .                                                        (N1) 
Notice now that: 
() () ( ) {} () ( ) { } ( ) 1 | () D QB + () C QB | \ ∈ ⊆ + ∈ ⊆ C Q D B s A s Q A A I + B A r QA B s A s I = =  (N2) 
Together, (N1) and (N2) imply (3.1).                                                                                                         ◊  
 
We shall establish part (ii) of Proposition 4.2 via the following three Lemmas. 
 
Lemma X1.  Let  () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ , and let   be some SCC with domain  S Z .  For all  , if   , AB ∈Z
, then the SSC,  , must satisfy (3.2) for all non-empty  S ( ) B A r ⊂ 1 ≤ B AI C I . 
 
Proof of Lemma X1.  If  1 ≤ B AI , then either [ ] φ = B AI  or   is a singleton.  Thus, there 
does not exist any non-empty   if 
AB I
() B A r C I ⊂ A 1 ≤ B I .  Hence, (3.2) must hold trivially.         ◊  
 
Lemma X2.  Let   () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ , and let   be some SCC with domain  S Z  that satisfies NC.  Let 
 be such that (  and  , AB Z ∈ ) AB ∈ U Z 2 ≥ B AI .  Then, for all non-empty  , the 
SSC,   must satisfy (3.2). 
() B AI r C ⊂
, S
 
[ B AI Proof of Lemma X2.  Consider any  Z B A ∈ , such that  ( ) Z B A E ∈ ≡ U ,  ] φ ≠ ≡ C , 
2 ≥ C ; and any non-empty  ( ) C r C ⊂ .  Let  ( ) ( ) C C r \ D ≡ .  Note that  ( ) C r ⊂ D ≠ φ .  Suppose 
(3.2) is violated, so that: 
() {} () ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( ) C B s A s Q B A r Q C A s B s Q A A B ∈ ⊆ + > ∈ ′ ⊆ ′ I I | \ | .                      (N3) 
We shall show that (N3) yields a contradiction, given NC.  First notice that, by NC, 
() () ( ) ( ) {} () ( ) ( ) A B r Q A B r B s E s Q A B r Q E E B \ \ ~ | ~ \ ≥ ∈ ⊆ ≥ I .                                  (N4) 
Now let  ( ) { } D C s B s ∈ ′ ⊆ ′ ≡ I | θ ,  ( ) { } D C s A s ∈ ⊆ ≡ I | γ   and  ( ) { } C C s A s ∈ ⊆ ≡ I | ϖ .  
Consider any   E s ⊆ ~  such that () γ ∈ A s I ~ .  Then ( ) D C s ∈ I ~ , so that () θ ∈ B s I ~ .  Hence, 
() {} ( {} ) θ γ ∈ ⊆ ⊆ ⊆ E s s E s I ~ ~ | ~ ∈ A B s I ~ | .  Thus, by NC,  
() ( ) {} () ( ) { } ( ) γ θ θ ∈ ⊆ ≥ ∈ ⊆ ≥ A s E s Q B s E s Q Q E E B I I ~ | ~ ~ | ~ ,                                  (N5) 
         () () ( ) ( ) ( ) {} () ( ) { } ( ) ϖ ϖ ∈ ⊆ + ∈ ⊆ ≥ + A s E s Q B A r A s E s Q Q B A r Q E E A A I I ~ | ~ \ ~ | ~ \ . (N6) 
By (N3) and (N6),  
 13() {} () ( ) ( ) {} () ( ) { } ( ) ϖ ∈ ⊆ + ∈ ⊆ > ∈ ′ ⊆ ′ A s E s Q B A r A s E s Q C A s B s Q E E B I I I ~ | ~ \ ~ | ~ |   (
From (N4), (N5) and (N7),  
N7) 
          () () () ( ) {} ( ) { } ( )> ∈ ′ ⊆ ′ + ∈ ′ ⊆ ′ C A s B s Q D A s B s B I I | |   +Q A B r Q B B \
() ( ) {} () ( ) { } ( )( {} () ) γ ϖ ∈ ⊆ + ∈ ⊆ + ∈ ⊆ A s E s Q A s E s Q B A r A s E s Q E E E I I I ~ | ~ ~ | ~ \ ~ | ~
   ( ) () A B r QE \ + .                                                                                                       (N8) 
Since C and D partition  ( ) C r , clearly,  ( )ϖ , \ B A r  and γ  partition  ( ) A r .  Hence, (N8) implies: 
  () () ( ) 1 1 = > = E r B r Q .  () QE B
This contradiction implies (3.2) must hold for all non-empty  when  .             B A C I ⊂ [] Z B A ∈ U ◊  
 
Lemma X3.  Let   () X r Z ⊆ ≠ φ , and let   be some SCC with domain  S Z  that satisfies NC.  Let  




 be A ⊆  such that  A
~
,  B B ⊆
~
, and [ ] [ ] B A B A
~ ~
I I = .  en, for all non-empty 
e SSC, S , must satisfy: 
) ( { (
Th
[] B AI , th C ⊂
() ( ) } ) ( ) ( ) () { } ( ) C B s A s Q B A r Q C B r Q
A A A A ∈ ⊆ + ≥ ∈ I ~ |
~ ~ \
~
s A s Q B A ⊆ + I | \ , (N9)              ~ ~
() {} () ( ) { } ( ) C A s B s Q C A s B s Q
B B ∈ ′ ⊆ ′ ≤ ∈ ⊆ ′ I I ~ |
~ ~ | ~  (N10)  .                                            
 
roof of Lemma X3.  Consider any non-empty  , let  () [ ] C B A r D \ I ≡ [ ] B A C I ⊂ P  and let 
() { } D B s A s ∈ ⊆ ≡ I |
~ ~ ~ γ ,  ( ) { } C .  Since  A B s A s ∈ ⊆ ≡ I |
~ ~ ~ ϖ A ⊆
~
, by NC, 
() ( ) { } ( ) γ γ ~ ~
| ~
~ ∈ ⊆ ≥ A s s Q Q A A I A                                    .                                                     (N11) 
rom (N11), noting that  ( )γ ~ , \
~
B A r  partition  ( ) A r
~
, we get:   and ϖ ~ F
  ( ) ( ) \
~ () ϖ ~
~
A A   ~ Q B A r Q +





\ ∈ ⊆ + ∈ ⊆ + ≤ A s A s Q B A r A s A s Q A A r Q A A A I I   .              (N12) 
otice now that:   N
{ ( ( ) }) ( ) { } ( ) C B s A s Q A s A A ∈ ⊆ = ∈ I I | ~ ~
| ϖ s QA ⊆ ;                                                      (N13) 




\ = ∈ ⊆ + I ( )) B A\ .                                        (N14) 
B B ⊆
~
, (N10) follows directly from NC.                        ◊   Together, (N12)-(N14) yield (N9).  Noting 
 
, and let   be some SCC with domain  S Z ℑ ∈ Z Proof of part (ii) of Proposition 4.2.  Let   which 
satisfies NC.  Consider any  Z B A ∈ , , and a -empty  ny non ( ) B A C I ⊂ .  To establish that the SSC, 
S , satisfies WASRP, we ne w that S  satisfies (3 ed to sho .2).  If  1 ≤ B , then (3.2) holds by  AI









,  [] B A B A I I = ]
~ ~
[  and ( ) Z B A ∈
~ ~
U .  Since ( ) Z B ∈ A
~ ~
U , by Lemma X2,   
( ) ( ) () { ( }) ( ) { } ( ) C A ∈ s B ′ ⊆ s QB ′ ≥ C B s A ∈ I s Q B A r Q




~ ~ ~ . 
◊ In light of Lemma X3, we immediately get (3.2).                                                                                    
 
() X r ⊆ Z ≠ Proof of Lemma 4.8.  Let φ .  Part (i) follows directly from Notations 4.5 and 4.7.   
(ii) Let  X  be finite, and let  ℑ ∈ Z .  Suppose  .  Then there exist   which satisfy 
(4.4) but violate (4.5).  Thus, there must exist distinct 
ℑ ∉ ˆ Z B A,
B A y x I ∈ ,
Z ∈
 and  , such that: 






A A ⊆ 0
~ {} y x ⊆ , y x ⊆ , B ⊆ B0
~ ( ) ( ) Z B ∉ 0 0
~
U ( ) B AU ⊂ B A U 0 0
~ ~
 and  A
~
].  But then, since 








0 ℑ ∈ } , y x 0 1
~
A A ⊆ ⊆ ,  ,  {} , y x 0 1
~
B B ⊆ ⊆
( ) () 0 B 0 A 1 1
~ ~
B A U U ⊂  and ( ) Z B ∉ 1 A1
~ ~
U ].  Proceeding in this fashion, we have an infinite sequence 













i B y x
~
, ⊆
 … , such that, for every positive integer i , 
[{} ,{} ,   and 
{1,2,...} ∈
i i 1 ⊆ + A A
~ ~
y x, ⊆ Z B A i i ∈
~
,
~ ( ) ( ) i i B A
~ ~
U ⊂ i i B A
~ ~
1 U + + 1 ].  This, however, 
contradicts the assumption that  X  is finite.  Hence,  ℑ ˆ ℑ ∈ Z  implies   , so that  ℑ ∈ ˆ Z ⊆ ℑ .  Since  
ℑ ⊆ ℑ ˆ  by part (i) of Lemma 4.8, part (ii) of Lemma 4.8 follows.                                                       ◊  
 
Proof of Proposition 4.10. 
(i) Let ℑ ∈ .  Let  be a degenerate SCC with domain  ˆ Z S Z , which satisfies NC.  Suppose   
violates WASRP.  Then:  
S
{ ( }) | ∈s x A there exist   and distinct  , AB Z ∈ , x yAB ∈ I 1 = ⊆ s QA , such that:    and 
{ ( , | ′ } ) 1 = ′ ∈ ∉ ⊆ ′ s s QB y s x B .                                                                                       (N15) 
Noting Lemma X2, (N15) implies () Z B A ∉ U .  Then, since  ,  ℑ ∈ ˆ Z








x, { } B y ⊆
~ () B U  and A B ⊂
~
x, B ⊆ ,  U  
( ) Z B ∈ A
~ ~
U )  ].                           
Now, since the SCC satisfies NC, (N15)-(N16) im
                                    
ply: 
                                                        (N16
  { } ( ) 1 ~ |
~ ~
~ = ∈ ⊆ s x A s Q
A  and  { ( }) 1 ~ |
~ ~
~ ∉ ⊆ ′ x B s Q
B , ~ = ′ ∈s y ′ s .                                   
N17) and Lemma X2 together i
    (N17) 
( ) B A ∉
~ ~
U Z  ( mply  , which contradicts        (N16).                                             
 
 15(ii)  In light of Lemma 4.8(ii), part (ii) of Proposition 4.10 follows directly from part (ii) of 
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